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ABSTRACT

A Lasting Impression: Higher Education’s Effects on Mass Polarization in the US:
A Case Study
by
Bradley Highfield
Advisor: David Jones

Political polarization has been growing exponentially over the past few decades, not only
with political elites and party activists, but also in the mass public. During the same period
of time, the United States has also seen an exponential increase in higher education
attainment. This paper examines the possible relationship higher education and elite
political polarization may have in regards to the increasing polarization within the
American electorate. Additionally, I aim to extrapolate how collegiate institutions create an
increase in ideological polarization, as well as affective partisanship, while synthesizing
Political Science studies on the effects of college education towards political identity with
Social Psychology theories such as Social Learning Strategies and Social Impact Theory.
Through this synthesis, powerful social forces and an increase in issue orientation combine
to create a strong bond of ideological orientation through advanced knowledge in public
policy issues and a political identity defined with oppositional animus toward out-group
political parties, which lasts well after an individual graduates from post-secondary
schooling.
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Introduction
People are shaped by the times and events they experience in their lives. I am
reminded of this when I hear high school students remark that they are tired—exhausted
by living through so many historical events in such a short period of time. The United States
is currently experiencing a plethora of historical moments that have taken the concept of
political polarization to the forefront of discussions, as well as how we take sides. In the
midst of a global pandemic, nontherapeutic safety measures are considered a political topic
as efforts such as wearing masks, social distancing, and economic shutdowns are viewed
through polarized lenses on the ideological spectrum of liberal to conservative. Election
results that have continuously been proven to be legitimate by election authorities and
court decisions are decried by political elites and partisan voters because they do not
accept the decision and the will of the overall electorate. I am currently writing this paper
within a week of the US Capitol Building being forcefully entered by a mob of angry citizens
with the purpose of stopping a Constitutional function and overturning a democratic
election. And this action was not only conducted by members of the greater population—it
was advertised and promoted by political elites from state legislators to members of
Congress and even the President of the United States himself. Our nation’s government and
its people are so fractured politically that members of Congress reacted after this event by
continuing to call the election fraudulent even after their lives were endangered by the mob
attack.
With all of this obvious and apparent polarization that exists currently in the United
States, it seems barely necessary to debate the question of whether polarization exists
anymore. However, it is now more than ever so important that our questions evolve to
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examine and debate what the causes and/or catalysts are that create and perpetuate this
polarization. Where it was once considered almost “prescient” to propose the possibility of
elite or popular polarization, we have arrived at a point where graphs and theoretical
explanations are practically no longer needed to prove such a scenario. The events listed
above easily prove this case.
In examining the causes and catalysts of this growth of polarization, it seemed
interesting to me that polarization within general society has grown during the same
period in which higher education attendance has also increased exponentially (Pew
Research 2017). Could polarization be linked to higher education attainment? Higher
education takes place at an age often referred to as most impressionable for political
orientation. And if it is true that earning college degrees at higher rates intrinsically
increases political polarization—how would this be happening? Are college and
universities polarizing institutions, or are there other factors that contribute to this
phenomenon?
Observing the various types of polarization, I will examine first, whether
polarization does happen within collegiate institutions; second, if it does, I will pinpoint
the type of polarization that is occurring and how it can be measured. This second goal may
involve more than one theory of polarization, and in fact, it may show that a combination of
theories could exist. Lastly, I will examine the formal and informal structures of collegiate
institutions using Social Psychology theories to extrapolate causes and/or catalysts for
spreading polarization within higher education institutions.

2

Literature Review on Political Polarization
Elite polarization exists, and though there was little debate over this statement in
the past it is now largely agreed upon by the academic community. Many scholars have
attributed the beginning of mass or popular polarization to be a top-down push by political
elites creating a partisan sorting (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012; Fiorina and Abrams
2008; Mason 2015). Morris Fiorina and Samuel Abrams observe within the scholarship that
a consensus has been building toward polarization in regards to mass polarization, as it
appears that the middle has been eroding and pushing away to the extreme ends. Though
certainly not uniform, nor a perfect “U” shape distribution on the political spectrum,
regardless, the center has disappeared in favor of movement towards the political extremes
(Fiorina and Abrams 2008, 566-67). Using data from the past few decades of the National
Election Studies (NES), surveys of political ideological affiliations show evidence of two
responses having eroded over time; the “don’t know” and “moderate” categories have been
siphoned off in favor of the ideological wings of the political spectrum from extremely
liberal to extremely conservative.
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Figure 1: Political ideology: National Election Studies, 1972 versus 2004. (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008, p. 570Figure 3)

The NES shows a minimal drop in “moderates, middle of the road” from 1974 to 2004,
while showcasing a statistically substantial drop in the “don't know, haven’t thought”
category during the same time period. Increases are seen in all other categories except
“slightly conservative” with the largest boost in responses for “conservative”—proposing
an overall shift towards stronger conservatism in the overall electorate from 1974 to 2004.
However, there is a plethora of literature examining the different ways that polarization
can exist, and also, how it has occurred within the overall populace.
The current debate among scholars centers on the motivation for mass polarization.
Are these political divisions separating based on ideological differences on policy issues, or
is this division parting due to affective political partisanship? Multiple scholars such as
John Evans (2003), who previously worked with Paul DiMaggio and Bethany Bryson in
1996, conducted research examining polarization specifically under the lens of ideological
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change in issue orientation. In both cases (with DiMaggio and Bryson in 1996 and then
alone in 2003), Evans found that no real statistical analysis of issue orientation yielded
results proving polarization, and in fact, polarization was found to have potentially
decreased in some areas. Fiorina and Abrams agreed with this assertion, while alluding to
political issue-orientation not being the best way to study polarization (2008). Alan
Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders may have actually provided insight to why some studies of
ideological polarization have not produced enough results. In their study of political
polarization based on ideological policy preference, Abramowitz and Saunders found that
ideological polarization applied differently depending on the level of interest and
engagement in 2004 (2008, 546):
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Figure 2: Ideological Polarization of US Electorate in 2004 by Level of Political Engagement (
Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008, 546)

Political polarization by ideological means is highly dependent on the level of engagement
the voter employs. When examining the graphs between the two groups of least engaged
and most engaged, there are stark contrasts. Those reporting to be in the “Least Engaged
Third” display a nearly symmetrical triangular graph. However, when looking at the “Most
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Engaged Third” a bimodal dispersion begins to take shape, eroding the middle to scatter
among the wings of the ideological spectrum.
Evans did leave the door open in his own research that would combine with
Abramowitz and Saunders. He did acknowledge discrepancies in the data for two
subgroups: College Graduates and Young People (18-29 year olds). Interestingly for Evans,
while most groups showed a decrease or general stasis in regards to polarization by issue
orientation, the subgroup “College Graduates” presented a greater attention to discourse
on social issues while eliciting results that showed a nominal increase, or at minimum, a
resistance to the decreases seen in all other groups. In regards to the subgroup “Young
People,” Evans found that there were slight increases in polarization on some issues, but
not all. However, in his conclusion, Evans proffered a hint towards a trend that he was not
originally studying that would lean towards the robust examination of political identity
research, “one exception found in DEB was increasing polarization between those who
identify as Democrats and those who identify as Republicans” (Evans 2003, 86).
Abramowitz provided similar assertions in regards to ideological polarization
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramowitz 2010). Utilizing the ANES data from 1956 to
2004, Abramowitz argues that “Ideological polarization is consistently greater among the
well educated,” adding “the more interested, informed, and politically active Americans
were, the more likely they were to take consistently liberal or consistently conservative
positions” (2008, 545). Specifically using data from 1982 to 2004, Abramowitz and
Saunders provide results that intimate increased ideological polarization when comparing
respondents that reported “No College” as opposed to “Some College” or “College Grads”
over the time period.
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Figure 3: Ideological Polarization in the American Electorate by Decade
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008, p. 544-Table 1)

In the period from 1982 to 2004, ideological polarization increased only two percentage
points for respondents that reported having “No College” experience. For those that
experienced “Some College” there was a moderately low increase to three percentage
points, which is small in comparison to the respondents that reported being “College
Grads” with an astounding thirteen percentage points increase from 1982 to 2004.
Interestingly, this shows the largest increase in comparison with all groups presented in
the study. Abramowitz and Saunders’ results breed interesting ramifications within the
study of mass polarization when understanding that the data collected from the NES from
1956 to 2004 shows that the percentage of respondents that have gone from “No College”
to “at least some college education” has essentially tripled in that time period (2008, 542).
While research from Evans and Abramowitz undoubtedly adds fascinating detail on
higher education attainment and how it factors into the political polarization debate, mass
polarization should not only be examined within ideological means. Edward Carmines,
8

Michael Ensley, and Michael Wagner (2012) held an opposing view in terms of what drives
mass polarization and how to quantify polarization in general. They believe that a
fundamental issue of failure in researching polarization by most scholars is getting lost
within the ideological diversity of the American electorate. Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner
believe that Abramowitz and Fiorina’s one-dimensional ideological orientation via policy
issues ignores the complexity of society, and that the study of polarization should be more
acutely focused: “Partisan identification is the single most important force identified by
researchers investigating the political attitudes and behavior of American citizens and
voters” (2012, 1633).
Liliana Mason makes a compelling argument that consolidates the previous claims
made so far to maximize potency for the rest of this paper. Mason faults the disagreement
within the academy about the existence of popular polarization by declaring any studies
examining popular polarization via issue orientation as obsolete due to her findings that
partisan-ideological sorting exponentially increases social polarization. Meanwhile, issue
orientation has seen very little [and quite possibly no] increase over the last few decades
when polarization has become abundantly clear in social interactions. “The result is an
electorate that may agree on many things, but nonetheless cannot get along” (2015, 129).
Shanto Iyengar defines this version of social polarization as affective polarization,
where “under conditions of group competition, the sense of group membership inculcates
positive evaluations of the in-group and correspondingly hostile evaluations of out-groups”
(Iyengar and Westwood 2014, 3). Mason and Iyengar contend that the most important
difference between partisans is inherently that they are oppositional in the existence of the
separation in groupings, which can be measured through the levels of animosity and dislike
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between such “out-groups” (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012, 406; Mason 2015). Mason
makes the argument that popular polarization has been increasing via sorting over the past
few decades based on political identity, where we have now arrived to a point where
Iyengar can provide data even showing that less than one in every ten marriages are
between opposing political party voters (Iyengar and Westwood 2014, 6). Perhaps most
interesting of Iyengar’s conclusions is that the overall distaste and animus between
political parties is stronger, more prevalent, and most often expressed publicly without
inhibition than similar attitudes towards race, gender, or religion. “The mass public may
offer centrist preferences, but they certainly sense that ‘the other side’ is an out-group
(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012, 412-413). While Americans are inclined to ‘hedge’
expressions of overt animosity toward racial minorities, immigrants, gays, or other
marginalized groups, they enthusiastically voice hostility for the out-party and its
supporters” (Iyengar and Westwood 2014, 23).
We must remain cognizant of the Aristotelian notion of mankind being a social
animal, and the political attribute derives from the social element. “When polarization is
understood as a largely social phenomenon, it becomes possible to identify political
influences that may drive increases in specific types of polarized behavior, judgment, and
emotion” (Mason 2015, 129). Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner’s argument to view individuals
by their party affiliation must be viewed as not only a political identity, but as a social
identity, one that is less methodical/logical and more emotional and psychological.
Partisanship by political identity is less about issue ideology, and more akin to what Mason
describes as being a sports fan. Unlike a “banker choosing an investment” the average
individual adheres to their party affiliation as though it is a sports team with which they
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have become emotionally invested. When their party loses an election, they are emotionally
affected, even when they may disagree with some of the issue positions of that party,
because they have become attached socially and psychologically (Mason 2015, 129-131). In
this case, polarization is described more accurately through Iyengar’s affective
partisanship, where polarization by political identity is equally about an individual’s selfidentification as much as it is also about that individual’s oppositional disposition to the
other party (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012, 1633; Iyengar and Westwood 2014).
Returning to the questions elicited by Evans, in which he proposes that there are
discrepancies in both “College Graduates” and “Young People,” his examination of mass
polarization generally leaves out any further research on these outliers. It is important to
delineate to what degree the attainment of higher education may have on the subject of
polarization. Why did “College Graduates” show signs of polarization, at least in issue
orientation, when others displayed a decrease? This raises several interesting queries.
What possible effect does higher education have on political polarization in the mass
public? If there is a polarizing causation by higher education, how do collegiate institutions
cause and/or spread polarization among the student body? Within the literature of political
polarization we have continuously seen a disagreement of whether polarization should be
measured through ideological issue-orientation, or rather polarization is a social concept
derived from affective oppositional partisanship. Perhaps higher education institutions
may provide a possible combination or melding of the two theories, as Iyengar has
proposed a possibility of such combinations generally (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).
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Literature Review on Effects of Higher Education
The genesis of scrutinizing higher education institutions within the context of political
socialization/ideology orientation comes from a few right-wing scholars and media outlets.
The justification is quite simple; there is a correlation stronger than almost any other
demographic in American Politics that with increased educational attainment an individual
leans more liberal.

Figure 4: Political Ideology according to Level of Higher Education Attainment by Decade (Pew Research,
2016)

This positive correlation breeds fear and resentment from conservatives that boils up
consistently in the media, pushing claims that the ‘liberal-elitist professoriate’ is
indoctrinating future generations while they are at college (Elchardus and Spruyt 2009,
446). The fear is exacerbated when examining the political leanings of college faculty
members that do lean disproportionately liberal/Democrat over
conservative/Republican—creating a fear that liberal professors regenerate cyclically like
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the snake eating its own tail, each generation of future professors guided by the leftist
professor before them (Campbell and Horowitz 2016; Dey 1997; Elchardus and Spruyt
2009; Mariani and Hewitt 2008; Zipp and Fenwick 2006). However, this gross overarching
claim falls short of explaining the facts about college faculty members’ political leanings,
and their pedagogical intentions (Zipp and Fenwick 2006).
Though studies lack consistency and often are narrow-focused in examining a
subsector of college institutions—such as some studies only examine private universities
(Mariani and Hewitt 2008), while other studies primarily survey selective liberal arts
colleges (Hanson et al. 2012)—it still remains accurate to ascertain that college professors
taken as a whole population would lean more liberal. But even the blanket statement that
professors are disproportionately liberal-leaning/Democratic voters does not take into
account the vast differences corresponding to departments and degree paths. Liberal Arts
and Social Sciences faculty overwhelmingly lean left, while Natural Sciences journey down
the middle of the road, and Business and Engineering professors lean right (Elchardus and
Spruyt 2009; Zipp and Fenwick 2006). Additionally, the type of institution also weighs on
the political orientations of the academic faculty, with two-year schools showing more of a
leaning toward conservatism than the average four-year institution (Mariani and Hewitt,
2008).
Scholarship has arrived to an overall consensus that professorial political ideologies
have very little effect on students’ political socialization/orientation. John Zipp and Rudy
Fenwick argue that any evidence they have seen about liberal bias in academia is anecdotal
at best, partisanship anger at worst (2006, 307). Interestingly, their study on pedagogical
intentions of professors relative to their political ideologies, provided results that were
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contrary to the “liberalizing indoctrination” of the general academy. Surveying professors’
opinions on what missions are best served with their own curriculums, self-identified
conservative professors viewed their mission as educators to “shape students’ values”
much more than their self-identified liberal colleagues. During the time period of 19891997 this pedagogical intention actually increased for right-leaning professors, while also
decreasing their commitment to teaching “creative thinking” in their classes (2006, 318).
Results such as these not only dispel myths of “liberalizing indoctrination” but also give
credence to the possibility that there is an increase in purposeful polarization (in terms of
ideological issue-orientation) among some faculty, even while collegiate faculty’s own
views, have broadly been showing somewhat of a moderating trend rather than a
polarizing one (2006, 320).
Mark Elchardus and Bram Spruyt came to a similar conclusion regarding the
potentiality of professorial inculcation of students towards liberal ideology. Examining this
concept within the context of degree paths, Elchardus and Spruyt sought to find whether
students have been self-selecting degree paths based on preceding political viewpoints
instead of political socialization via professorial indoctrination (2009, 447). While they
show that students did shift ideology during their college tenure, with Social Sciences
students shifting more left, Law and Economics students shifting little left or not at all, and
Criminology students shifting slightly right; professor-induced socialization proved very
little evidence of existence. However, Elchardus and Spruyt did find substantial evidence
that self-selection into politically charged degree paths was exceedingly dependent on the
prospective student’s pre-existing political ideology (2009, 456-57).
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Irrespective of professorial influence, there remains credible evidence that higher
education institutions do influence and increase the political ideology of the student body.
Colin Campbell and Jonathan Horowitz completed an impressive study to monitor and
record differences in socio-political opinions towards civil liberties within sets of siblings
where only one sibling attended college (2016). The aim of the study was to delineate
between political socialization influenced by family background to isolate the effect of
college education and experience. Campbell and Horowitz concluded that family
background does have a strong influence in political socialization, as well as the likelihood
of college completion; however, college education does promote socio-political beliefs that
influence favorability towards civil liberties (2016, 48). Through “interaction with peers,
presence of ‘free spaces,’ and direct peer socialization” students increased favorable beliefs
compared to their non-attending siblings (2016, 41). Nevertheless, they did add that little
to no “significant effect on overall political orientation can be found” from their results, as
evidence has also shown that liberalizing and conservatizing exists simultaneously
amongst the various institutions. Conservative institutions conservatize their students, as
liberal colleges tend to liberalize their students—adding that this is not through
professorial influence (Campbell and Horowitz 2016, 56; Mariani and Hewitt 2008, 778).
As much as professors have been found to be of little influence, we cannot ignore
that political orientation does occur on college campuses. Too much evidence has been
found that results in movements along the political spectrum, and in Eric Dey’s words,
“higher education is increasingly being held accountable for the outcomes it produces, even
if these outcomes occur completely independently of any formal institutional action”
(1997, 399). There are two specific studies—one completed by Mack Mariani and Gordon
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Hewitt, and the other by Eric Dey—that propose we are looking at statistics wrongly in
reference to polarization within higher education. Scholars embarked on these studies to
prove whether or not colleges “liberalize” students, and along with the information above,
both Mariani and Hewitt, and Dey arrived at the conclusion that there are forces pushing
students more leftward AND more rightward along the political spectrum during their time
in college. Dey goes further by arguing that his evidence “shows no obvious trend over
time” in regards to a substantial net liberalization when taking into account conservative
institutions’ effect of conservatism (1997, 408). Mariani and Hewitt’s study even pinpoints
specific personal traits that weigh differently in a student’s movement of political
orientation, showing that women tend to liberalize more than men at college, and that
there is a stronger movement rightward correlating to the level of the student’s family
income (2008, 776).
Both studies elicited findings that are foundational to this paper’s overall focus: Are
colleges creating and/or expanding polarization? Mariani and Hewitt’s study, though
limited in its breadth of higher education institutions (mainly focused on private colleges
only), did show a net liberalization of graduates from freshman year to graduation four
years later. Their study found:
“Almost 57% of the students identified the same orientation as seniors
as they did as freshmen. Another 23% reported a change of one scale
placement to the left, and another 4% reported a change of two or
more to the left. To the right, 14% reported a change of one scale
placement and a little more than 2% reported movement of two of
three placements. In all, 27% moved to the left and 16% moved to the
right” (777).
Most scholars might analyze this data and declare that this study proves that colleges are
more liberalizing than conservatizing (net), but I noticed something different.
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Approximately 43% moved either left or right of their original location on the political
spectrum. While it is true that more people shifted left, little under 40% of the graduates
who have shifted moved to the right. These numbers are substantial enough to warrant
examination into the effects of college environments causing polarization instead of only
liberalization.
Dey’s study examines similar trends over a much longer period of time. Utilizing
data collected from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIPR) and the General
Society Survey (GSS), Dey compiled self-ratings of political orientation cohorted into four
groups spanning 25 years (1966-1970; 1971-1980; 1983-1987; 1987-1991). Results show
similar findings to the Mariani and Hewitt study:

Figure 5: Change Over Time in Follow-Up Survey Cohorts;
Note: Table reprinted from (Dey, 1997, 406 - Table 3)

In all four cohorts the Average/Middle-of-the-Road shrunk, and specifically in the later two
cohorts (1983-1987; 1987-1991) the erosion of the Middle-of-the-Road group was not only
substantial, but it also shifted to both sides of the political spectrum. As with Mariani and
17

Hewitt’s study, the disappearing middle spreading in both directions provides more
evidence of a polarization rather than a one-sided liberalization. These trends, specifically
in the 1980’s, can be viewed better by the following graphs:

Figure 6: Trends in Political Self-Identification 1966-1991;
Note: Table reprinted from (Dey 1997, 407 - Figure 1)

In the graphs above, overall trends in increasing self-identification in liberals and
conservatives can be seen in the early to mid 1980’s in both the CIRP and GSS. For both
liberals and conservative to increase the middle must erode, creating a bimodal splitting of
the American electorate—which in this case is specific to voters just after attending four
years of college (Dey 1997, 406-407).
The evidence is clear throughout the literature thus far. Scholars have successfully
disproven the myth that radical left-wing professors are indoctrinating, and generally they
have found very little evidence of any political indoctrination of any kind. Higher education
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institutions do shift their students’ political ideologies, with potential reorientation that
results in overall polarization. How does this affect the overall political theater? If we know
statistically that “Young People” seldom vote, which has been the case historically, to what
extent can this finding have on future popular polarization, whether short-term or longterm? The answers may lie in higher education’s effects on political awareness and
engagement.

Higher Education - Ideological Polarization or Affective Partisanship?
The literature suggests that colleges and universities have been found to increase political
engagement and participation in political events, over individuals who have not attended
any college. This effect of boosted political participation could be an interesting binding
that conjoins the distinct concepts of ideological polarization (Abramowitz 2014; Evans
2003) and affective partisanship (Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Mason 2015).
Higher education attainment is positively linked to increased political participation
more than almost any other predictor (Hanson et al. 2012, 356; Hillygus 2005, 26; Mayer
2011, 644). Sunshine Hillygus was not content with this assertion, as it requires a causal
mechanism. Why are college graduates more participatory in politics than those that did
not attend university? Is it similar to the self-selection theory where people whom are
innately predisposed to politics are more likely to attend college, or is higher education the
causal mechanism? Hillygus divided these questions into Civic Education Hypothesis—
college education increases an individual’s understanding of politics, public policy, and the
role of a citizen in a democratic government—and Political Meritocracy Hypothesis acting
as a self-selection method (2005, 28-29). Joe Lot II et al. argues in favor of Hillygus’s Civic
19

Education Hypothesis adding that an increased knowledge in political matters, ability to
discuss differing viewpoints, and the crystallization of their own values and political
ideologies, all enhance a college graduate’s positive relationship to political outcomes (Lot
II et al. 2013, 897). Ultimately, Hillygus found that the Civic Education Hypothesis had
strong evidence while the Political Meritocracy Hypothesis lacked consistency in results
based on metrics linked to increased college attendance (2005, 39). Interestingly, Hillygus
also found that credits taken in Social Sciences subjects were positively linked with
improved political participation more than any other subject. Although completion of a
college degree was inherently linked to increased engagement in political action, students
with higher amounts of credits related to Civic Education subjects were even more induced
to political involvement regardless of the level of collegiate institution (2005, 37-41).
The repercussions of higher education increasing political participation cannot be
ignored when added to the potentiality of amplified polarization through a possible
amalgamation of ideological polarization and affective partisanship. Ryan Claassen and
Benjamin Highton highlight that those that have higher levels of political awareness are
more susceptible to the effect of elite polarization due to an increased understanding of
issue orientation (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Claassen and Highton 2009; Hanson et
al. 2012, 355-56). This is exacerbated by the assertion from Hanson et al. that our twoparty system inherently pushes the potential dispersion to eventually become polarized.
The potential for lasting and aggravated effects in the general populace is likely
increased due to the magnitude of the political engagement of college graduates, as Lott II
et al. intimates in delineating between differences in political actions from merely voting to
direct action to influencing political outcomes. Lot II et al. found that college graduates not
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only vote more often, but they also engage in political activities that influence political
structures as well, such as campaign volunteering, attending a political rally or meeting,
donating money to a party or campaign, or contacting a public official via mail, phone, or
email (2013, 902; 923). Political activity of this level not only reinforces voting
participation, it also guides a subgroup of the American electorate beyond an enriched
understanding of issue orientation increasing ideological polarization, while
simultaneously breeding affective partisanship due to an enhanced emotional and
psychological attachment from increased participation in the process (Mason 2015).
This possibility of a combined polarization through ideological means supplemented
with affective partisanship bears consideration when examining the social structures
within the college experience. Hanson et al. proposed many social and interrelationship
experiences within the institutions “coalesce” to “influence greater than the sum of its
parts” (2012, 367). Hillygus suggested that the college’s “community may socialize
individuals to participate in political communities or may impart some of the basic
associational skills necessary to function in the political and civic realm” (2005, 41). Lot II
et al. add that some structures indirectly influence political engagement in the graduate’s
future through experiences in study abroad programs, service-learning projects, learning
communities, and student organizations; while also admitting the strongest likelihood
stems from socialization from “organizational, interpersonal, and intrapersonal processes”
such as dorming, athletic clubs and teams, and fraternal organizations (2013, 897-900).
This thesis builds upon the idea in the literature that social interactions are a key
causal mechanism affecting political opinions and behavior. Liliana Mason describes
political identities as being inherently social identities: “When polarization is understood
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as a largely social phenomenon, it becomes possible to identify political influences that may
drive increases in specific types of polarized behavior, judgment, and emotion” (2015,
129). If we look at political socialization and polarization on college campuses through a
lens that realizes this process as a social development, we can synthesize ideological
polarization with affective partisanship through natural human tendencies and instincts by
adapting Social Psychology theories. Using these theories, I intend to show that an
amalgamated version of affective partisanship and ideological polarization is a natural,
chaotic process that occurs in heterogeneous socio-political environments specifically
using college campus experiences, which inherently sorts individuals via combinations of
conflict-avoidant behavior and social-acceptance desire, creating increased gravitation
towards homogeneous groupings that increase partisanship.

Politics, Higher Education, and Social Psychology Theory
The time period defined as being the most impressionable in terms of political orientation,
is also a time when individuals are taking college classes on socio-political topics while
interacting in groups of other social-minded individuals who are consistently being pushed
to “have an opinion” or “make up their mind” on political issues (Andolina et al. 2003, 255277). This period of enhanced socialization, combined with close proximity and
provocation towards political orientation, creates an environment where “students balance
their own predispositions and goals with normative pressures generated by various groups
in changing and maintaining their attitudes, values, and beliefs” (Dey 1997, 398). However,
setting the system for this naturally occurring chaotic alignment would possibly require a
quasi-random reorganization through an enhanced distribution.
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Robert Lupton, Shane Singh, and Judd Thornton sought to quantify the effect that
network disagreement had on partisanship. Viewing freshman year dorming assignments
as being a perfect microcosm to examine this effect, with the quasi-random assortment of
roommates and floor-mates in college dormitories proves a catalyst to bring together
potentially opposing viewpoints and political identities. Unlike later years in college where
students have been provided the chance to be realigned into more homogeneous groups,
freshman year forces individuals to live in close proximity with other students that may
have dissimilar views. Lupton, Singh, and Thornton hypothesized that these quasi-random
groupings of potentially opposing views create networks of disagreement, which would
decrease partisan identities within the enclosed networks (2015, 399).
The 2000 ANES study allowed Lupton, Singh, and Thornton to examine sets of
college freshmen who responded to the survey asking to identify up to four individuals in
the respondent’s close proximity while classifying those individuals by perceived political
affiliation. Observing this data, it was concluded that “exploiting the quasi-random process
of college dormitory assignments” mitigates self-selection of social networks according to
political preferences (2015, 404). The study had stimulating though somewhat
unsurprising results, but further implications could have substantive effects on the political
nature of college campuses. Lupton, Singh, and Thornton found that network disagreement
of individual-level relationships does significantly affect partisanship; however, additional
conclusions provide “strong support for the idea that one’s partisanship has a social
component” and is not solely based on an individual’s “intrinsic characteristics.” Their
findings also “suggest that the impact of political discussion on attitudes is considerable”
adding to the socialization theory proposed by Mason (2015, 409).
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Theoretical study on the topic of conformity within the field of Psychology provides
ideas on the way people accept and internalize information. Examination of social
conformity through the lens of social learning strategies that focus on spatial and temporal
variants provides the ability to understand how college students rebuild their political
ideology in the years after freshman year (Morgan et al. 2012, 653). Researching the use of
multiple strategies simultaneously in order to recreate more natural tendencies, Morgan et
al. produced compelling evidence for the argument that humans are easily swayed to adopt
conflicting viewpoints under social settings. In several experiments, various forms of
viewpoint transference took place whether a subject had low confidence levels in their own
opinions, or even when they were fairly certain. Subjects were more likely to switch their
opinions with an increased amount of social consensus, especially when the number of
demonstrators in the majority opinion increased. “Three of four experiments found that the
rate of copying increased with number of demonstrators,” while “in all cases, subjects were
more likely to copy as consensus increased.” Subjects also displayed an increase in
“copying-when-uncertain rule” as low confidence levels associated with continued mistakes
in choice gave way to increased levels of trust in others (2012, 659).
Morgan et al. found that in a social setting, particularly in an environment where
ideas and viewpoints are frequently shared (such as a college environment that pushes the
exchange of socio-political discussion), people are likely to adopt and internalize dominant
viewpoints regardless of conflict with their own intrinsic beliefs. In a set population,
“conformity results in the disproportionate adoption of popular traits at the expense of
rare traits” (2012, 606).

24

But are we all faithless followers of majority opinions? If we are to understand that
human beings are rational and logical animals, we must be able to exhibit cautionary
controls—fact-checking ambiguous and/or possibly false claims. Youjung Jun, Rachel Meng,
and Gita Venkataramani Johar aimed to analyze the effect perceived social presence had on
the propensity to invalidate opaque information. They used eight experiments to test
whether people are less likely to verify statements’ validity when perceiving the presence
of others, even when that presence is not direct. Jun, Meng, and Venkataramani Johar found
overwhelmingly people tend to default towards taking others at their word, especially
when under the pressures of a social environment—either physical or virtual like social
media (2017, 5976-77). Unlike the study conducted by Morgan et al., people fact-checked
less often regardless of the size of the group in their presence and irrespective of the
importance of their position or role. Confidence levels based on ranking and positions of
authority had no adverse effect on the decreased fact-checking. The only variable
influencing the subject was the indirect or direct observation from others (2017, 5679-80).
Based on these three studies, we begin to collect credible arguments that humans
are less the rational and logical beings, and much more the emotional animals that react to
social forces that push and sway our political orientations according to the enclosed
environments by which we surround ourselves. While this evidence is quite persuasive, it
is only supplemental. What is required to construct this argument is a meta-theory capable
of synthesizing the aforementioned research with the underlying premise of increased
polarization and partisanship within higher education.
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Dynamic Social Impact Theory
Bibb Latané (1981) developed Social Impact Theory to demonstrate “how both individuallevel variables and external forces contribute to the spread and communication of political
attitudes.” Attitudes in this instance refer to the “mental representations” that sum up an
individual’s evaluation of ideas or notions (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 350). While
researching social influence effects, Latané arrived at the understanding that situational
conformity motivates attitude change, even against an individual’s own interests. To
measure this, Latané created the meta-theory of Social Impact Theory, to ascertain the
strength of external influences on a targeted individual. The model observes social forces
similarly to physical forces such as gravity or magnetism; each individual is surrounded by
other individuals with their own specific opinions, interacting from numerous measurable
distances—all extrapolated and viewed mathematically. When an individual is the “target”
of external sources of influence, multiplicative factors of “strength” (influentiality),
“immediacy” (distance), and “number” (total population of direct and indirect influencers)
form the mathematical equation for conformity (attitude change). Similar to Lupton, Singh,
and Thornton, Latané’s theory posits that an increase in the number of targets creates a
division of the social influence force through dispersive pushback (2013, 350-51).
Nicholas Seltzer, April Johnson, and Karyn Amira’s study sought to first recreate the
original simulations conducted by Latané and his colleagues Andrej Nowak and Jacek
Szamrej. Using a forty-by-forty tile grid, individuals are displayed in dichromatic visuals of
white and black squares based on “agent attitudes” split by binary partisanship. Each
timestep allows for 100 generations for each agent to analyze surrounding influences,
internalize the external positions, and reevaluate their own stance. Replicating the original
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simulation, the following figure provides a visual representation of a randomized starting
configuration, as well as the socially impacted configuration after eighteen timesteps
(iterations) originally conducted by Nowak, Szamrej, and Latané:

Figure 7: Original SIT Binary Partisanship Grids by Generation, 1st and 18th;
Note: Table reprinted from (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 358 – Figure 2)

Beginning with an arbitrary assortment chosen without prejudice, the image on the left
would best describe Lupton, Singh, and Thornton’s quasi-random process of dormitory
assignments, placing students in non-linear, chaotic environments of extreme dispersion.
As time moves on, students begin to coalesce into ideologically homogeneous clusters of
varying sizes. Each cluster, regardless of size, reinforces itself through mutual partisanship
between its individual members reciprocating ideological beliefs and norms via discourse
(2013, 358).
As each version of the simulation creates virtually limitless possibilities, the more
recent simulation conducted by Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira produced the following figure
of the configuration after eighteen timesteps (like the original), and the configuration after

27

fifty timesteps (which was not possible to create originally due to technological
computation limitations):

Figure 8: Updated Binary Partisanship Grids by Generations, 18th and 50th;
Note: Table reprinted from (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 359 - Figure 3)

Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira’s simulation provided similar results in terms of overall
populations for each group, albeit with less clustering. Comparable to the original
simulation, agents conjoin into homogenous groupings, which are yet to have combined to
form a fully polarized population. However, by the fiftieth timestep the smaller
homogenous grouping not only found each other to form one solid homogenous population
of like-minded influencers, they also recruited more agents. Interestingly, through their
simulations, results showed repeatedly that minority groups did not go extinct even in
situations of extreme statistical inferiority, and “small minorities can find an opportunity to
recover some ground if they are able to establish a solid pocket” (2013, 359). Only in
iterations where the minority group is 5% or less of the overall population did extinction of
the minority opinion occur. Otherwise, the foothold is planted and maintained even with
potential for growth (2013, 363).
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With approximately twenty years of technological advancement in computational
power; Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira were able to take Nowak, Szarej, and Latané’s research
further to not only calculate and display the binary external representation of agents’
attitudes—they were also able to compute and provide grey-scale shadings to provide for
visualization of internal attitudinal strength. In the next set of figures, we are able to
examine the relationship of attitudinal strength relative to the spatial location of the agents
within the homogenous zones. For clarification, the darkness of the shade indicates the
increased strength of the internal attitude for that agent; a black square displays a fully
partisan actor:

Figure 9: Attitudinal Strength from Binary Depiction to Spectral Comparison, 5th Generation;
Note: Table reprinted from (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 360 – Figure 4)
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Figure 10: Attitudinal Strength from Binary Depiction to Spectral Comparison, 10th Generation;
Note: Table reprinted from (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 360 – Figure 5)

As with the previous simulation, after five timesteps we begin to see clusters forming,
which by the tenth timestep the clusters form into groupings. With the internal views, we
can examine the marked areas in Figure 4 to elicit data to comprehend the attitudinal
strength of the agents within the clusters/groups. Darker shaded areas on the internal
views display agents feeling strong attitudes when situated within clusters where their
constant interactions are by influencers that reinforce their own beliefs. In Figure 5, areas
that contain higher amounts of dispersion maintain lighter shades in the corresponding
internal views of attitudinal strength, showing that ideologies are not yet partisan (2013,
359). In the following Figure 6, we see homogenous groups develop while increasing
attitude potency at fifteen timesteps, before entrenching and fortifying by twenty timesteps
with few isolated outliers:
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Figure 11: Attitudinal Strength from Binary Depiction to Spectral Comparison, 15th, 20th, and 40th
Generations; Note: Table reprinted from (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 360 – Figure 6)

In the graph above, the distinctions of attitude strength based on spatial location become
clearer as we move through timesteps fifteen to twenty, with inherent clarity in timestep
forty. Exploring the displays at the fortieth timestep allows us to observe extreme
polarization that solidifies within a population in a closed environment. Deep within the
dichotomous zones of homogeneity, ideological attitude strength reaches the highest
partisanship with very few instances of ambivalence. Along the borders we see a vibrant
battle of social forces charging agents to become influencers and the influenced
simultaneously as they debate ideas. But these confrontational agents at the borders
insulate the members within the groups to maintain reciprocating forces of influence with
each other, and also to fuel the attitudinal strength of the ideological skirmishers. “Minority
opinions are able to persist in the face of majority opinions by agents sorting into tightly
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organized, self-reinforcing pockets. We also find that once such homogeneous regions are
formed, agents’ attitudes within these pockets are held with greater certainty” (2013, 364).
Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira were able to capture simulations that mathematically
calculate the trajectory and rate at which individuals in a closed environment charged by
ideological discourse will innately push and pull each other into bimodal political
polarization. This initial polarization will eventually advance with enough time into
extreme sorting with heightened partisanship. College campuses provide perfect scenarios
to exhibit these ideological sortings in their closed environments with on-campus housing,
social activities, clubs and organizations, athletic clubs and teams, and fraternal
organizations. These integrated social structures, combined with the promotion of political
opinion formation and increased civic pedagogy, forces students to contemplate and
discuss their viewpoints with and around their peers, creating the mechanisms that allow
Social Impact Theory to shape political attitudes by a multifaceted gravitational-like force
of social influence and pressures. The end result is a congregation of dueling groups of
ideological homogeneity reinforced by recursive partisanship.

Synthesizing the Theories
This paper applies SIT to findings in the previously discussed literature on political
attitude formation during college to develop a new explanation/hypothesis of how college
increases affective partisanship and ideological polarization. Regardless of institutional
action or purpose, these social forces of attraction and detraction naturally occur on
collegiate campuses pushing and pulling the heterogeneous student body to join in-groups
of increased homogeneity through the influence of recruitment, cultural attachment, class
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identity, or social conformity (Andolina et al. 2003, 279; Dey 1997, 411; Mendelberg,
McCabe and Thal 2017; Morgan et al. 2012; Seltzer, Johnson and Amira 2013). Lupton,
Singh, and Thornton’s conclusions offer an interesting dynamic into the political
orientation that happens during the years attended at a university, potentially placing
freshman year as an ideological reset for individuals through the quasi-random dispersion
theory. College students emerging from the freshman reset make for fertile saplings eager
(subconsciously) for conformity to the dominant ideology, especially when placed within
groups with increased ideological homogeneity. These networks of disagreements could be
viewed as heterogeneous pods that wrest individuals’ childhood political standpoints away
to make them vulnerable to differing ideas, offering them an additional three-plus years to
formulate and codify new political identities in a politically-charged environment ripened
by social influence forces.
Agreeing with Morgan et al., Latané’s meta-theory proposes that “the size of one’s
social network also plays a role in shaping political attitudes,” and that low confidence
levels breed more seamless conformity (2013, 351-353). At a time perhaps most
impressionable in their lives, students are brought into the quasi-random assortment that
shakes us from our political predispositions, only to be reconfigured according to the most
dominant viewpoints of the localized majority group, while disarmed by their own lack of
fortitude to enact fact-checking measures to belie social influence form shaping their
political identity. Though Social Impact Theory seemingly argues that strong confidence
levels make attitudinal change incredibly difficult (which would inhabit relatively few cases
as young people tend to be pliable in their beliefs), citing confirmation bias as a
fundamental tool for enlarged stubbornness, even the most confident partisans may be
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conformed through nearly excessive levels of contrarian evidence and will likely hold the
new viewpoint with equal fortitude (2013, 353-54).
Latané’s meta-theory also gives added weight to Mason’s argument of ideological
homogeneity increasing partisanship. Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira’s renewed study on
Social Impact Theory acclimated to the social dynamics of college campuses, show that
homogeneous social groups maintain increased tenacity in attitude stasis due to greater
social benefit in conforming to social “group norms as well as information cascade effects.”
Now, targets who have conformed instantly and simultaneously become influencers
(partisans) themselves engaging in ideological discussions and debates. Interestingly,
widespread ambivalence did not halt the spread of “semi-permanent social structures of
attitudes,” even though disinterested targets were not necessarily cognizant of being
influenced by members of their surrounding environment (Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira
2013, 363).
We do see with the computer-simulated iterations that caveats may exist in this
process though. Ideological influence and attitudinal changes do not simply occur with
complete holistic orientation. While polarized viewpoints are imbued with oppositional
contrasts, it still remains true that some individuals do have conflicting political ideologies
based on socially reified traits enhanced by self-awareness to issues that may have an effect
on their lives. Tali Mendelberg, Katherine McCabe, and Adam Thal researched one specific
case study where certain traits within individuals have compelling social attributes that
positively correlate with specific political standpoints on issues of economic policy
(Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017).
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Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal agree that colleges inherently drive students to
develop political orientations through socialization, creating lasting effects of political
attitudes that can remain firm for decades. Ideally, they do give credit to Latané’s Social
Impact Theory deriving rudimentary formulation of causation that aligns with the
principles of that theory. Their exception-to-the-rule actually performs like a derivation of
the rule by hypothesizing and concluding that affluent students either become or remain
economically conservative (while not socially conservative) during their time in college,
while middle-class students have the opposing effect in relation to economic policy (2017,
607). The uniqueness of this study lies within the magnitude of the correlation where
affluent students attending colleges with higher rates of general affluence, intrinsically
become more conservative in these views, while often having opposing ideological views
on social issues (2017, 612).
Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal assert that affluent students learn, develop, and
internalize class awareness in predominantly affluent schools within social settings with
other upper-class students displaying affluent lifestyles. As affluent families tend toward
conservative ideologies, the natural congregation of these students by lifestyle creates a
normalizing effect in conservative political views with the in-group. Class Culture Theory
posits that socio-economic classes tend to congregate via cultural norms, where nonaffluent students will not integrate with affluent students, as they do not identify with their
cultural norms; such as extravagant weekend getaways, Spring Break trips, clothing and
apparel, hobbies, and to some extent language. While increased financial aid brings
students from lower-income families to colleges with high rates of affluence, only to be
quasi-randomly assorted by dormitory assignments, Class Culture Theory emphasizes that
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inter-class relations will be mitigated by the lack of awareness and empathy for individuals
with opposing socio-economic norms—particularly in the United States where income and
wealth inequality are higher than most other developed nations (2017, 621).
Latané’s Social Impact Theory does have explanations for this trend that applies to
both ideological polarization and affective partisanship. Specific parameters are used to
measure the potency of the social forces that affect the influence exerted on agents by their
surrounding peers. Four of these parameters can potentially diminish chances of
attitudinal changes between cross-class interactions. “Issue Importance” has an ideological
effect on whether a student from a lower economic class background would adopt
viewpoints that would inherently hinder their own progress and wellbeing, calling to a
heightened understanding of their social standing and issues that would negatively affect
them. An individual is highly unlikely to favor alterations to a progressive tax system or
financial aid funding that provides increased equity for them. “Persuasiveness” is limited by
the lack of empathic connection to understanding how the individual from an opposing
social class lives. An affluent student will be less likely to be persuaded to adopt policies
that affect their lifestyle to alleviate hardships for another lifestyle they cannot envision.
Interestingly this combines ideological polarization and affective partisanship by adhering
issue positions oppositional to the individual’s out-group.
Letané’s notion of “Motivated Reasoning” also combines Abramowitz’s
acknowledgement of increased understanding of political issues with Mason’s concept of
oppositional teamsmanship. The transference and acceptance of opposing information
enters through a process of confirmation and disconfirmation biases, as targets are likely to
immediately react favorably to information that agrees with their preconceived beliefs and
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apprehensively to information that contradicts. Additionally, one other parameter acts as
an anti-catalyst for inter-class influence—“Supportiveness” keeps individuals within their
homogenous cultural groups by supporting the norms and beliefs they already hold and
with which comfort has been established. Supportiveness can also have an indirect role in
affective partisanship by acting as reinforcement for oppositional identity (Mason 2015,
130; Seltzer, Johnson, and Amira 2013, 354-57).

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine the potential relationship between higher
education attainment and political polarization. Throughout the review of literature on the
subject of polarization, the two prevailing types of polarization within the topic of mass
polarization are locked into the ideological polarization camp, which views polarization
through issue orientation, and the affective partisanship camp, which sees polarization
through a social lens of teamsmanship that solidifies oppositional animus towards the outgroup. Interestingly, the literature on both the overall study on polarization and the
literature on the effect higher education may have on polarization concludes that both
types of polarization (ideological and affective) can be bound together in the case of higher
education. As post-secondary education enhances learning and understanding of political
issues and the effects of public policy, a college graduate is more knowledgeable of the
nuances and minutia of issue orientation. Additionally, the social forces that are the very
fabric of college campus life, supplemented with a charged academic atmosphere that
forces discussion on political ideology, creates a naturally chaotic push and pull to
individuals to gravitate to become accepted into socio-political homogenous groupings.
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These groupings not only emit partisanship via participatory emotional connection, they
also recycle ideological discussion that commits partisan identity with issue orientation.
Using Social Psychology theories, I argued that the accumulation of homogenous
groupings is a naturally chaotic phenomenon that occurs on college campuses. Humans are
social animals and inherently seek out acceptance in social settings more easily through
agreement and approval, rather than argument and discord. Previous studies have shown
that individuals are less likely to fact-check in social settings, as well as trust group
mentalities and beliefs, leading impressionable youth to join and become assimilated into
the in-group’s ideology. Becoming part of a group, according to Social Psychology,
inherently provides the individual emotional attachment and connection to the success and
failure of that group, which in turn breeds animosity towards the success and happiness in
the failure of the opposing out-groups.
This amalgamation of affective partisanship via group attachment, combined with
the increased understanding of issue orientation creates a political identity made strong by
an internal enhancement of understanding personal issue orientation, while maintaining a
reflection of the external definition by oppositional out-group. The college graduate knows
their political identity not only by understanding themselves and what they want to fight
for—but also who their opponent is and why they should be against them.
More research and studies need to be conducted to examine this theory. The
combination of two types of polarization complicates the efficacy of studies that could
provide statistical data. Additionally, one of the complications I encountered the most in
my research was that most studies used data from surveys that were completed by 2004. In
the study of polarization, there has been a lot of change in the past sixteen years, as well as
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college attendance, new studies would undeniably be beneficial to acquiring a more
accurate assessment on the connection of higher education attainment. I am not sure if
different approaches are as necessary as the importance of having existing studies updated
with more recent numbers—preferably utilizing data from 2008 to 2018.
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